



Georgia:

A Country Report Based on Data 1900-2012

Authors:

Medet Tiulegenov, Eitan Tzelgov, Valeriya Mechkova, and Staffan I. Lindberg

V-Dem Country Report Series, No. 3, October 2013.

Prepared for The European Union, represented by the European Commission
under Service Contract No. EIDHR 2012/298/903

About V-Dem

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualization and measurement of democracy. It is a collaboration between some 50+ scholars across the world hosted by the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden; and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame, USA.

With four Principal Investigators (PIs), three Project Coordinators (PCs), fifteen Project Managers (PMs) with special responsibility for issue areas, more than thirty Regional Managers (RMs), almost 200 Country Coordinators (CCs), a set of Research Assistants (RAs), and approximately 3,000 Country Experts (CEs), the V-Dem project is one of the largest ever social science research-oriented data collection programs.

V-Dem is collecting data on 329 indicators of various aspects democracy tied to the core of electoral democracy as well as six varying properties: liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian dimensions of democracy.

A pilot study in 2011 tested the preliminary set of indicators and the data collection interfaces and procedures. Twelve countries from six regions of the world were covered, generating 462,000 data points. In the main phase, all countries of the world will be covered from 1900 to the present, generating some 22 million data across the 329 indicators, as well as several indices of varying forms of democracy.

The resulting database will be the largest of its kind, and make possible both highly detailed, nuanced analysis of virtually all aspects of democracy in a country, and quick, summary comparisons between countries based on aggregated indices for at least seven varieties of democracy.

The data will be downloadable from a public V-Dem website as a public good some time in 2015. Users from anywhere will also be able to use sophisticated but intuitive and accessible online analysis tools. Students and media across the world will benefit from the nuanced comparative and historical data. Governments, development agencies, and NGOs will be able to make much better informed decisions, and even go back in time to re-evaluate aid efforts.

V-Dem is funded by (in order of magnitude): The Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Sweden, the European Commission/EuroAID, the Swedish Research Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Denmark, the Danish Research Council, the Canadian International Development Agency, NORAD/the Norwegian Research Council, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, and the Quality of Government Institute.

For further details and information, see <http://v-dem.net>.

Table of Contents

About V-Dem.....	2
Table of Figures	4
Executive Summary	5
1. Introduction.....	6
2. General Political Developments in Georgia	7
3. Varieties of Democratic Developments in Georgia.....	10
An Overall Measure Disaggregated	10
Complexities of Increasing Electoral Contestation.....	12
Stable Electoral Participation.....	14
Electoral Legitimacy Driven by Losers' Acceptance	16
The Janus-Face of a Democratic Party System	18
Drilling Down Into Civil Society	21
Tracking the Improvements of the Media.....	23
Uneven but Improving Civil Liberties.....	25
Judicial Independence and Autonomy on the Rise	28
Deliberation	31
Rising Political Equality?	34
4. Conclusions & Reflections	35
References.....	36

Table of Figures

Figure 1. V-Dem Index disaggregated in Georgia (1990-2012)	11
Figure 2. Electoral Contestation in Georgia (1990-2012)	12
Figure 3. Electoral contestation disaggregated in Georgia (1990-2012)	14
Figure 4. Electoral participation in Georgia (1990-2012).....	15
Figure 5. Electoral participation in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012).....	16
Figure 6. Electoral Legitimacy in Georgia (1990-2012).....	17
Figure 7. Electoral Legitimacy in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)	18
Figure 8. Parties Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)	19
Figure 9. Parties Dimension in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)	20
Figure 10. Civil Society Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012).....	21
Figure 11. Civil Society Disaggregated (1990-2012).....	22
Figure 12. Media Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)	24
Figure 13. Media Dimension in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012).....	25
Figure 14. Civil Liberties Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)	26
Figure 15. Civil Liberties - 10 most democratic indicators Georgia (1990-2012).....	27
Figure 16. Civil Liberties – 9 least democratic indicators Georgia (1990-2012)	28
Figure 17. The Judiciary Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012).....	29
Figure 18. The Judiciary Dimension in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)	30
Figure 19. Deliberation Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)	32
Figure 20. Deliberation Dimension Disaggregated (1990-2012)	33
Figure 21. Equality Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)	34
Figure 22. Equality Dimension in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)	35

Executive Summary

- The aggregated (illustrative) V-Dem democracy index shows an uneven but gradual improvement over the post-soviet period that confirms with familiar observers' account of Georgia.
- At the same time, indices of the components of the overall democracy index show great variability of different dimensions of democracy. This highlights the importance of the disaggregated approach to measuring democracy that V-Dem enables.
 - Electoral legitimacy and judiciary, and in the early period electoral contestation, are below the average score while the rest are moving in tandem with or above the average.
 - The biggest up- and downward swings are displayed by the indices for electoral legitimacy measure. Drilling down shows that losers' refusal to accept the outcome of elections is largely responsible for these swings.
 - Several individual indicators of civil society reflects the highly varying engagement in politics, with a lower score at present signifying the return to more stable, constitutional rule.
 - It is notable that the index for media is not only above the average democracy score, it have also improved in almost every year since independence. For the media sector, bias has been significantly reduced, criticism of government picked up, and the range of perspectives provided by media has increased significantly.
 - Civil liberties are another area where many positive developments are found. Among the areas of concern are still access to justice, women's equality, and freedom from torture that still is rated well below average.
 - The judicial sector and rule of law is clearly the area where Georgia's democratic development is lagging farthest behind and where we find significant issues that are in need of attention.
- The V-Dem scores provide an overview of the uneven, and yet steady path of Georgia's democratic development. The future will show how well country develops in the coming years.

1. Introduction

The post-soviet transition and the processes of democratization attract attention from academic as well as practical perspectives. It is now more than twenty years since successor states to the Soviet Union (as well as former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia) faced challenges of embarking on transitions towards democracy. Some have materialized while in other countries these processes have stagnated or even slid back. A number of post-soviet countries relatively early became authoritarian (such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), some since early independence set on the democratization path (most notably Baltic countries), while others were fluctuating in between and some experienced rapid downturns (as in Belarus by mid 90s). Georgia is an interesting case among them.

The transition path of Georgia is somewhat similar and yet different from that of many post-soviet countries. It has experienced coups and popular revolts leading to the overthrow of the governments (as in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) thus presenting a case of development of democratic indicators amidst such large scale and dramatic upheavals.; it has had to deal with separatist movements and breakaway regions (like Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Russia); and witnessed uneven and often strained relations with Russia. With a fairly active engagement from the US and EU, Georgia has pursued various reforms of its democratic institutions that were most prominently related to the state building in early and mid-90s and institutional changes after 2003. Understanding how regime change and general state building process relate to each other is not only a matter of academic conceptualization, but also a case of practice in a country such as Georgia. Reforms by Shevardnadze in mid 90s, or by Saakashvili since 2004 can be viewed from various perspectives that are presented by various components of V-Dem measure.

Georgia is considered as a success case among post-soviet countries by many standards. Each of the post-independence leaders – Zvyad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili – was initially igniting hopes for democratic developments in the country. With various degrees these expectations were not fully met, and the current leader awaits a peaceful transfer of power in the coming 2013 presidential elections, while two of his predecessors were violently overthrown.

The objective of this report is to elucidate the nuances of Georgia's path towards democracy by a detailed inspection of the V-Dem indicators, as well as portray the situation of the country's political situation as of 2012.

2. General Political Developments in Georgia

There have been three changes of the government in the post-soviet Georgia and two of them were unconstitutional. Georgia achieved independence in 1991 amidst political upheavals. Just shortly before the collapse of USSR on April 9 of 1989 a peaceful demonstration was forcefully disbanded and 20 people were killed. This led to further discreditation of communist rule and unification of the anti-communist opposition into *Free Georgia* that won majority of seats in *Umaghlesi Sabcho* (Supreme Council) in the fall of 1990.

On April 9 of 1991 the parliament of Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union and opposition leader Zvyad Gamsakhurdia was elected president on May 26 of 1991. He promised to assert Georgia's authority over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that had autonomous status.

At independence Georgia faced rising movements of various autonomous regions on its territory. This was preceded by skirmishes between Georgians and Abkhazians in the summer of 1989, and violent clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian nationalist groups in South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast in the fall of 1989. Regional elections organized without the authorization of the central government in Tbilisi in the fall of 1990 led to a new regional council that declared an South Ossetian Republic independent. In response, the parliament of Georgia abolished the autonomous republic which led to further brawls. Elections to the regional council of Abkhazia were held on the basis of power sharing agreement making Georgian and Abkhazian groups of deputies to come to joint decisions.

President Gamsakhurdia was deposed in a coup d'état at the end of December of 1991 (known also as the "Christmas coup") instigated by the National Guard and paramilitary groups of *Mkhedrioni* (the Riders). This led to a civil war lasting until 1995. Eduard Shevardnadze, the former communist leader of Georgia (1972-1985), returned to the country in 1992 and together with leaders of the coup – Tengiz Kitovani and Dzaba Ioseliani – he formed and headed a triumvirate called the State Council.

The 1992 elections resulted in a parliament with no clear majority but supportive of Shevardnadze. In 1993 the actual fighting in the war in Abkhazia ended with the defeat of Georgian forces. Shevardnadze sought support from Russia and Georgia joined Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In May of 1994 a Russian brokered cease-fire was signed between Georgian government and Abkhaz separatists. Russian troops (under the aegis of CIS troops) served as peacekeeping forces.

A popular leader of National Democratic Party (Georgi Chanturia) was assassinated in December of 1994 and Tengiz Kitovani was arrested in January of 1995 for leading an armed group supposedly for regaining Abkhazia. In August of the same year there was an assassination attempt on Shevardnadze. A minister of interior who allegedly had connections with leaders of the paramilitary organization *Mkhedrioni* militia was charged. The Mhedrioni was banned.

On August 24 of 1995 a new constitution of Georgia was adopted with checks and balances and separation of power but with a greater role of the president than previous constitutions had provided for. Parliamentary elections should take place every four years, while presidential polls are to be held every five years. Elections to the parliament are based on a mixed electoral system. In the fall of 1995 presidential and parliamentary elections were held in which Shevardnadze was elected as a president of Georgia and his party – the Citizens' Union of Georgia – won majority of seats in the parliament. Revival Union, a party of the leader of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazeti, Aslan Abashidze, and the National Democratic Party, also won seats in the new parliament.

In February of 1998 Shevardnadze survived another assassination attempt. In 1999 Georgia's Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU entered into force (it had been concluded in 1996) On October 31, 1999 parliamentary elections were held and the Citizens' Union of Georgia increased its seat-share. Other winning parties included Abashidze's Revival Party and the Industrialists Party. In the following year Shevardnadze was re-elected in the presidential elections.

On October 31, 2001 the security forces raided the popular TV station Rustavi-2 that had often been critical to the government. This incident led to public demonstrations. Zurab Zhvania, the reformist speaker of the parliament, resigned in protest. Mikheil Saakashvili, the minister of justice, also resigned from his position and formed the National Movement opposing the government. On June 2, 2002 local government elections led to losses of the ruling party. In November of 2002 Saakashvili became the chairman of the City Council of the capital Tbilisi. In 2003, popular unrest took place amidst accusations of electoral fraud in November 2 parliamentary elections. President Shevardnadze was deposed through a popular revolt named the "Rose Revolution". The revolution was led by Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, and Nino Burdzhanadze (the speaker of the parliament). On January 4 of 2004 Saakashvili was elected as a president of Georgia with overwhelming majority of 96 percent in elections that were considered free and fair by international and local observers. Zurab Zhvania was appointed as prime minister.

New parliamentary elections took place on March 28 2004 and the United National Movement – (which was created as a merger between Saakashvili's National Movement and United Democrats led by Zhvania and Burdzhanadze) received 66% of the votes. The only other group that passed the 7% threshold was the bloc of New Right and Industrialists. These elections were believed to be the freest in the post-soviet time.

After elections the Georgian leadership faced the first political crisis with Aslan Abashidze, the leader of southwestern Autonomous Republic of Abkhazeti, who largely ignored the central government. These tensions threatened with military confrontation resulting in resignation of Abashidze in May of 2004. The success in Abkhazeti emboldened Saakashvili's efforts to bring back South Ossetia, which led to armed clashes in August of 2004, and the stalemate ensued. Dealing with another crisis, Saakashvili successfully disarmed rebellious militia in Khodori gorge in July 2006.

On May 9-10 of 2005 the President of the USA, George W. Bush, visited Georgia and proclaimed it a "beacon of democracy". In May of 2005 Georgia signed an agreement with Russia on withdrawal of its remaining military bases to be completed by 2009. The October 2006 municipal elections led to domination of United National Movement in all municipalities of the country. Under Saakashvili Georgia achieved considerable progress in combating corruption, so according to Transparency International Georgia ranked 67th in the Corruption Perception Index in 2008, up from 133rd place in 2004.

The relations of Georgia with Russia were not easy throughout the 2000s. On August 7 of 2008 the strained relations with Russia erupted into military clash between troops of the two countries. This led to what was called the South Ossetia war (or Russian-Georgian war). It ended on August 12 when Russian president Medvedev halted Russian troops advancement in Georgia.

In the 2008 presidential elections Mikhail Saakashvili was reelected with 53,5 percent of the votes. In the referendum held concurrently with the presidential elections it was decided to schedule parliamentary elections in spring instead of fall of 2008, and elections took place in May. The referendum also reduced the number of seats from 235 to 150 in parliament and the threshold from 7 to 5%.

In the parliamentary elections Saakashvili's United National Movement received 59,1% with the remaining votes received by four other parties.

A fragmented opposition was demanding resignation of Saakashvili in spring of 2009 and tensions led to protests and arrests, all these happening as the country was preparing for municipal elections in 2010. Several members of the opposition Democratic Movement-United Georgia Party, headed by Burdzhanelidze after she broke with Saakashvili in 2008, were arrested in 2010. The opposition parties formed series of shifting alliances.

The 2012 parliamentary elections were contested by a number of political parties and the results significantly changed the post-Rose revolution composition of the legislature. These elections took place after reforms of electoral system agreed by ruling and oppositional parties in 2011. It envisioned that 150 seats in the parliament include 77 seats allocated proportionally to party lists and remaining 73 to the winner of single member districts. The reform also involved relocating the legislature from the capital city Tbilisi to the second largest city Kutaisi. The coalition Georgian Dream won 54,9 percent of the votes. United National Movement founded by Saakashvili in 2001 took the second place with 40,34 percent of the votes. The leader of Georgian Dream Bidzina Ivanishvili became the prime minister. It was the first peaceful transfer of power in Georgia. After presidential elections of October 2013 many constitutional amendments passed from 2010 to 2013 will take force and pass significant powers from the president to the prime minister.

3. Varieties of Democratic Developments in Georgia

The indices in the figures below have been produced using a simple procedure, whereby we use a number of variables to capture the varying dimensions¹ of democracy, and their variation over time. For each of the elements we present a figure capturing the temporal variation of the dimension as a whole, along with an additional figure presenting its constituent indicators (all presented with using a uniform standardized scale). Please note that the overall index of democracy in Figure 1 is based on an unweighted average of the scores obtained from specific dimensions.


An Overall Measure Disaggregated

The Figure 1 presents an overall illustrative V-DEM democracy index, along with the ten components used to estimate the index.² The overall democracy-index is the red thick line in the graph. It should be stressed that at the time of the authoring of this report, the V-Dem project had not yet settled on an exact composition and aggregation method for its planned seven indices of varying democracies. The overall index in the Figure 1 is therefore illustrative only and not to be confused with the eventual (coming) indices of democracy that V-Dem will produce. Nonetheless, the overall index gives a broad sense of the democratic development in Georgia over the period that tracks fairly well the developments as sketched above. Figure 1 includes six indicators that on average have higher values than the overall measure. They are in general consistent with the overall pattern. The indicators included in this graph are: access to justice for men displayed by thin blue line and for women - the thin green line, freedom of discussion for men – the thin purple line, religious freedom - the thin orange line, freedom from torture – the thin yellow line, transparent laws of the land - the thin brown line.

¹ Throughout this report we use the concepts component/dimension interchangeably to denote the VDEM's ten aspects of democracy.

² There are various ways to aggregate the components into the overall index. Here we opted for a simple index that captures the mean of the ten component scores for each year.

Figure 1. V-Dem Index disaggregated in Georgia (1990-2012)



The overall V-Dem index (the thicker red line) shows a slow increase since 1992 with putting various state institutions in place and overcoming the state fragility with drops in 2003 (the year of parliamentary election that led to Rose revolution) and in 2007 with largest anti-governmental rallies since the 2003 which were dispersed with the state of emergency and snap presidential elections scheduled for early 2008.

From 1993 there was strengthening of political and state institutions and the fragility of the state has been diminishing whereas since 1998 there was a reverse trend with criminal groups coming back to the scene.

Upward movements in the overall index are visible in 2004 with the first relatively freer and fairer parliamentary and presidential elections taking place immediately after the Rose revolution; and in 2012 with first elections which resulted in peaceful transfer of power (a prime minister coming from the opposition).

Figure 1 also depicts the developments over time for each of the components of the overall index. This makes it possible to see which component is driving the development of the overall index up and/or down in varying periods. It also illustrates how complex measuring democracy is with different dimensions clearly being independent of each other, and that all good things do not necessarily “go together” as it were.

The figure demonstrates that there is a high degree of variation over time in the levels of various components of democracy. Most striking are the over-time changes in the levels of the *electoral legitimacy* component, as well as the changes in the levels of the *electoral contestation* dimension over time.

Note especially the “bump” in the levels of this component following the 2003 election (from an average values of 0.08 during the 1990-2002 period to an average of approximately 1 during the 2004-2012 period). This illustrates the demarcation line of electoral processes before and after the Rose revolution with higher electoral contestation and legitimacy after this landmark event.


The component indices that display the highest values in terms of being more democratic, on average, throughout the period are *equality*, *media* and *civil society*. These elements were essentially the related to relative liberalization which was present throughout the post-soviet history of Georgia.

In the following, we provide a closer look at all these various components, down to the level of composite indicators for Georgia.

Complexities of Increasing Electoral Contestation

Figure 2 presents the electoral contestation dimension.³ Most notable is the sharp increase in the component’s values in 2004. A more moderate decline follows in 2008.

Figure 2. Electoral Contestation in Georgia (1990-2012)



The peak of component in 2004 reflects that the presidential and parliamentary elections in that year were considered as being much more free and fair than ever before, and that these elections enabled various parties to *de facto* contest for

³ We break down the electoral component into three sub-components to reflect its multi-dimensional complexity.


power. The domination of United National Movement's position the parliament reduced the score in 2008 since the level of contestation and hereby choice declined, but it went up with 2012 parliamentary elections when its opponents won a majority of seats.

A look at the disaggregated measures (Figure 3), reveal that almost all indicators generally follow the trend of the overall component index. The component index indicator is displayed with the thicker red line in Figure 3 while the individual indicators are presented by thinner lines with varying colors.

In the case of electoral contestation in Georgia thus, most aspects of the component move in tandem and reflect the same underlying latent concept. The main exceptions are the *vote buying* (thin red line) indicator that went down in 1995-1998, and the *government intimidation during elections* (thin pink line) that is constant during the period. The *public campaign finance* indicator (thin light green line) follows the general trend but it significantly better in "democraticness" than most other indicators over the period. It picks up in 1995 and then again in 2004, to drop in 2012 elections adequately picking up changes in elections laws.

In Figure 3 the main index (thicker red line) can be compared to the measures of individual indicators. The thin red line reflects coders' assessment on the change in election boycotting in the examined period; the thin blue line assesses the autonomy of the election management body; the thin dark green line indicates the capacity of the election management body; the thin dark pink line is the measure of lack of vote buying; the yellow line details lack of voting irregularities; the thin light pink line lack of government intimidation; the orange line whether elections were free and fair; the light blue line whether there were paid campaign advertisements; the thin brown line whether there were paid interest group media (if interest groups are allowed to buy campaign advertisement time on national broadcast media); the thin light green line whether there was a general availability of public finance for campaigns; and finally the thin black line indicating whether all political parties had some free access to national broadcast media during election campaigns.

Figure 3. Electoral Contestation Disaggregated in Georgia (1990-2012)




It is also worth noting the continuing positive developments in several respects. *Free and fairness* (thin orange line) of elections continues to improve until 2012 and so does the instances of *voting irregularities* (thin yellow line), the *electoral management body's capacity* (thicker green line) to run elections and the *electoral management body's autonomy* (thin blue line) from the ruling government. While there is still room for improvement in the contestation component of democratic elections in Georgia, it seems that the country is largely on track in this regard.

Stable Electoral Participation

Figure 4 presents a very different picture when we inspect the temporal variation (or lack thereof) in the *electoral participation* component. The stable level of participation in Georgia is also at a fairly comforting level hovering closer to 1.0 on the standardized scale where 2.0 would be the highest possible score and -2.0 would indicate complete absence of participation. The difference between the levels and trend for the electoral contestation component discussed above, and this stability recorded for the electoral participation component also testifies to the value of the disaggregated approach to measurement that V-Dem makes possible. It is clear that these two critical aspects of the electoral dimension of democracy, does not co-vary but are distinct aspects in need of separate measures in order for us to portray the situation for electoral democracy in Georgia adequately.

The most visible change in the value of the series is a moderate and short decline in 2003, which was related to the parliamentary elections of that year that led to protests over the stolen votes and the ensued ousting of the president.

Figure 4. Electoral participation in Georgia (1990-2012)




The development of each component of the overall index is presented in Figure 5. The measure of *electoral participation* is aggregated from four indicators – *accurate voter registry* (thin black line), *male suffrage* (thin green line), *female suffrage* (thin blue line) and *lack of restriction on female suffrage* (thin dark pink line).

Inspection of each individual indicator's values in Figure 5, reveals that the slight decline in the component measure of *electoral participation* (the thick red line in Figure 5) can be attributed to the steep decline in the values of the election *voter registry* indicator⁴ (thin black line).

⁴ voter registry "In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?"

Figure 5. Electoral participation in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)




This is picking up (adequately) that the voter registration was poorly organized in the parliamentary election of 2003. The evaluation of the V-Dem country experts for Georgia regarding the voter registry is supported by the reporting by the International electoral observation mission of OSCE/ODHIR who monitored these elections.

Electoral Legitimacy Driven by Losers' Acceptance

The final component for the electoral dimension of democracy, regards *electoral legitimacy*. This is a critical component in that democracy as rule by the people over itself requires the system to be legitimate in the eyes of the people in order to function (as different from authoritarian systems that do not necessarily have to rest on popular legitimacy). The general trend for this component index is displayed in Figure 6.

There is a high degree of variation for this aspect in Georgia's short history, with the lowest levels of the series being in 1991 and 1992, in 2003, and in 2008. The stolen parliamentary election in 2003 led to the Rose revolution, and then to elections of 2008. In contrast, the values of the component are highest in 1990, 1999-2000, 2004, and in 2012.

Figure 6. Electoral Legitimacy in Georgia (1990-2012)



The parliamentary and presidential elections of 2004, and the 2012 parliamentary elections resulted in high values of electoral legitimacy. But what specific factors hide behind these overall developments?


Figure 7 evidences that the marked changes in the component index for electoral legitimacy most of all reflect to the *loser accepts result*⁵ indicator (thin black line) and to some extent also by the changes in the indicator for *peacefulness of electoral process* (thin green line).

The biggest reductions in the measure of losers' acceptance of the results-indicator occurred in 2003 and in 2008. These democratic deficits in electoral legitimacy are associated with the parliamentary elections of 2003 and with the presidential election of 2008. After each of these elections, the majority of the main opposition parties who came out as losers of the elections refused to accept the results at first and the V-Dem indicator displays this clearly. Meanwhile, legitimacy improved with the elections in 2004 when also the electoral peace improved significantly whereas in the second half of 90s and in early 2000s the environment for elections in terms of violence was much worse.

Figure 7 explores further the *electoral legitimacy* index by presenting each component separately. The measure of *electoral legitimacy* is aggregated from three indicators – *electoral peace* (thin green line), *winners assume office* (thin purple line) and *losers accept results* (thin black line).

⁵ v2elaccept "Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?"

Figure 7. Electoral Legitimacy in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)




The 2012 legislative elections took place after reforms of electoral system agreed by ruling and oppositional parties in 2011. With the successful conduct of these elections, all major opposition parties accepted the results boosting the legitimacy component of elections in Georgia.

The Janus-Face of a Democratic Party System

Figure 8 presents over-time variation in the *party system* dimension. This index seeks to measure the extent to which both political parties and the party system enables citizens to choose their leaders and exercise choice. The overall party system indicator does not change all that much, perhaps surprisingly. The relative stability is punctuated by rise in the component's level in 1992, followed by a slight downward movement in 1996, and another improvement in 2004 again to be followed by a slight decrease in 2008.

Since their onset, elections in the post-soviet Georgia were based on party lists and the upsurge on the score from 1992 captures the early development of parties while the increase in 2004 displays the dynamics of the Rose revolution. The declines in 1996 and 2008 were the results of the parliamentary elections in 1995 and 2008 that led to domination of presidential parties.

Figure 8. Parties Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)



V-Dem's approach to measurement provides a venue to get further leverage on what is behind the relative stability of the overall index of the party system in Georgia.

Disaggregating the component (Figure 9) we can see that the different indicators of this component vary a lot more than the overall index. Sometimes the indicators move in opposite directions thus cancelling out each other's impact on the overall index which then stays relatively stable.

For example, *barriers to parties*⁶, *party linkages*⁷ and *party switching*⁸ contribute to the increase in the levels of this component in 1992 (among other indicator), while the rise in 2004 can be mostly attributed to *opposition parties autonomy*⁹, *legislative party cohesion*¹⁰, and *barriers to parties*.

⁶ v2psbars "How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?"

⁷ v2psprlnks "Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?"

⁸ v2psswitch "Roughly what percentage (%) of the members of the national legislature changes or abandons their party in between elections?"

⁹ v2psoppaut "Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?"

¹⁰ v2pscohesv "Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?"

Figure 9. Parties Dimension in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)





Figure 9 drills down further to explore the changing qualities of the party system in Georgia. The index discussed above is the unweighted average from nine separate indicators. They include to what extent all or some political parties are banned (thin orange line); whether there are significant restrictions on the right to form a party (thin dark pink line); whether opposition parties can operate independently of the government (thin green line); whether parties have distinct platforms enabling voters to make informed choices at the polls (thin light pink line); whether parties have national and local level offices making it possible for citizens to engage with them (thin black line); whether legislators of the same party vote cohesively in the legislature so that voters can predict how their votes will affect policy (thin blue line); to what extent political parties rely on public policies rather than use clientelistic goods to attract votes (thin brown line); and to what degree legislators switch parties between elections thus undermining the sovereignty of voters (think light blue line). Higher values of the indicators mean fewer restrictions and more autonomy, clearer party platforms and less reliance on clientelism, and higher levels of voting cohesion and less party switching. In Figure 9, the overall index of the democratic qualities of the party system is also preserved and displayed with the thicker red line.

The party building process was intensive in early 90s and then again after the events of 2004. After the latter period, parties have become more cohesive, more autonomous, and the political system's barriers to entry has been lowered (in particular with the lowering of the 7 percent threshold for attaining legislative seats down to 5 percent).

It is also interesting to note that the period from around 1994 to around 2008 that was turbulent and generally perceived as a period when democratic aspects of the Georgian system were negatively affected, is a period when two indicators improve: party switching increases (whether that is an improvement or not can be debated of course), and the distinctness of political parties' platforms increases. At the same time, several other indicators of the "Democraticness" of the party system in Georgia suffers from decreasing levels in this period. Among them we find legislative party cohesion, parties' linkages with the population, and barriers to political parties. Here is an interesting pattern of contradictory trends that perhaps portrays a general pattern of what constitutes a weaker development in the area of democratic party systems.

Drilling Down Into Civil Society

Figure 10 presents the index of the *civil society* dimension in the red thick line. This line was the thin brown index indicator in Figure 1.




Most notable in the figure are the rapid rise in the level of the index between 1991 and 1994, which is attributed to the early liberalization and creation of enabling environment for emergence of civil society in the initial post-Soviet period. We also take note of the decline in 2002 and the subsequent rise in 2004 that are attributable to consultation and entry into public life after the end of the state emergency following the elections in 2003 and the protests around that time. The last drop is

also interesting from the 2010 to 2011 when Georgia settles in to constitutional rule, the level of activism and engagement in civil society has apparently gone down.

Figure 11 presents a disaggregation of the measure into its composite indicators. It reveals that the increase in 1991-1994 can be attributed to the *CSO entry and exit* indicator¹¹ depicted by the green thin line.

The index of civil society is aggregated from seven indicators, including whether civil society groups (CSOs) are consulted by policy makers before making major decisions about policy (thin blue line); whether the government exercises control over the entry and exit of CSOs in public life (thin green line); to what extent women have the same de facto possibilities as men to participate in CSOs (thin black line); whether civil society is characterized by a pluralistic and open environment or dominated by a few large organizations (thin orange line); to what extent CSOs and religious organizations are free from government repression (thin brown and light pink lines); and whether there are anti-system movements present or not (thin dark pink line). In the following figures, all the scores of individual indicators are displayed using standardized values so that they are comparable to each other.

Figure 11. Civil Society Disaggregated (1990-2012)



The following changes in the level of the *civil society* index can be attributed to the *CSO consultation* indicator¹² found displayed by the thin blue line. The consultation indicator first peaks in 2000 after Shevardnadze won his second term in office, but then rapidly drops to the year preceding the Rose revolution after which it goes up

¹¹ v2cseeorgs "To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations...?"

¹² v2cscnsult "Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?"

till its next decline in 2010. These drops and upward turns adequately describes the changing situation in Georgia in this period.

Note also the fluctuations in the levels of the *CSO anti-system movements* indicator¹³ between 2003 and 2009, portrayed by the thin red line. The shift in the anti-system movement indicator which drops significantly after 2004 and then rises up rapidly in 2007 reaching its peak in 2008 coming to the same level as in the times of the State Council in early 90s. The next drastic drop happens in 2010, then going on the rise since 2011 with more consolidation of the opposition. In the Georgian example this indicator seems to be a particularly important indicator of possible revolutions and upheavals that are indeed intended to turn the existing system upside down, along the lines of the design and intention from the V-Dem project's side.

The other indicators of *civil society* do not vary over the period. According to the V-Dem coders of Georgia, the participatory environment of civil society in general as well as the repression of religious civil society organizations and women's equality in terms of participation in civil society, is unchanged over the period.

Tracking the Improvements of the Media

Figure 12 presents the over-time variation in the Media component. The two take-away points from the figure are a mild positive trend over time in the 1990-2008, punctuated by a decline in 2008.


The growth in the media indicator over the most of the post-soviet period is the result of the early liberalization with two hundred print independent media and several national broadcasters. The drop in 2008 reflects some of the pressure on media following the Georgia-Russia war. It also captures the decline in independence of some media whose ownership became opaque and seemingly more controlled by the government, thus reducing the spectrum of independent voices.

Figure 13 drills down further in the media situation in Georgia over the period by showing both the overall index and its constitutive individual indicators. Throughout the period all indicators were either unchanged at mediocre to high levels of freedom, or generally on the rise.

Corruption in the media sector (dark orange line), censorship efforts by the government (yellow line), harassment of the media (light orange line), the amount of criticism the media levels against the government (black line), and the level of self-censorship (light blue line) are more or less stable over the period in Georgia, albeit at varying levels. Among them, harassment of journalists and the level of self-censorship are areas where there is a continuing concern about the level democratic rights and freedom in Georgia.

¹³ v2csantimv "Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?"

Figure 12. Media Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)



For Georgia, three indicators of the *media* dimension (thick red line) are *access to media*¹⁴ (thin red line), *media bias*¹⁵ (thin green line), and *range of media*¹⁶ (thin pink line), seem to be particularly important in capturing the changing landscape.


Figure 13 presents the over-time variation in the specific media indicators. The overall measure of media freedom (thick red line) is aggregated from ten indicators, including if there is media bias in favor of the government (thin green line); the extent to which government attempts to censor the media and the internet (thin dark blue and yellow lines); whether journalists and editors are corrupt and alter their news coverage in exchange for payments (dark orange line); to what degree the major media routinely criticize the government (thin black line); the what extent journalists risk being harassed by the government if they voice critical views (thin light orange line); whether media represent a wide range of political perspectives (thin light pink line); what level of self-censorship there is among journalists (thin light blue line); the percentage of population who have access to media (thin dark pink line); and the percentage of female journalists (thin purple line).

¹⁴ v2meaccess "Approximately what percentage (%) of the population has access to any print or broadcast media..."

¹⁵ v2mebias "Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?"

¹⁶ v2merange "Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?"

Figure 13. Media Dimension in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)



The range of perspectives provided by the media (a critical aspect of most perspectives on democracy) in Georgia has been stable at a fairly modest level throughout the turbulent 1990 to 2008 period. Then it increased substantially after the 2008 elections that brought the current regime in place and laid a promising foundation for a more lasting democratic situation in Georgia.


Media bias in favor of the government improved steadily from the early 1990s but then diminished in 2007 to 2008 with the government attempting to counterweight criticism by some of the independent broadcasters by making state controlled media highly biased in their favor. This was also the time of the war with Russia and the increasing instability it brought. Again, the post-2008 election period led to a fairer media presentation of perspectives and criticism than before, driving up the overall media index.

Uneven but Improving Civil Liberties

Figure 14 presents the *civil liberties* dimension in an overall index including a set of 19 indicators that measure various aspects of the extent to which both men and women enjoy the full range of civil liberties in Georgia. Much like with the *media* dimension, a general modest upward trend is visible, punctuated by slight downward

trend in 2008 around the time of the turbulence with a state of emergency and the proxy-war with Russia with more political pressure being put on the opposition.


Figure 14. Civil Liberties Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)



The aggregate figure for civil liberties, however, hides significant amounts of important variation between varying areas. Since 19 indicators were used to estimate the civil liberties index, the two plots below are presented disaggregating this index into the indicator level. The first figure focuses on the civil liberties with the lowest average “Democraticness” over the period measured. The second figure below then accordingly picks up and displays the nine indicators with the average highest levels.

Figure 15 presents the first set of ten indicators that on average across the 24 year period are lower in their level of “democraticness”. The ten indicators included in Figure 15 are: whether women and men are *free from forced labor* is displayed by the thin brown and dark blue lines; *freedom of travel and immigration* is indicated by the thin green line; the indicator for *discussion of politics for men* is found by the thin black line and for *women* by the thin light orange line; the extent to which women enjoy the *right to private property* is pictured by the thin red line; the *freedom of movement for men* is displayed in the thin purple line and for *women* in the thin blue line; *freedom of political killings* is portrayed by the thin pink line; and lastly, the degree of *cultural freedom* is found by the thin dark orange line.

Figure 15. Civil Liberties: “Most Democratic” indicators Georgia (1990-2012)



While overall, these indicators are at a lower level, there are significant improvements for most of them, especially in the later years.

The figure also shows the tumultuous upturns and downturns in the years of 1991-1995 until the new constitution was adopted and the upheavals of early independence were behind.

Among other trends, it is important to note the increase in the level of the *impartial public administration*¹⁷ (thin red line) in 2004, which shows the biggest increase over a year among indicators in this measure. This is picking up the reforms initiated by the new government, which was mostly tackling the issues of corruption and were considered quite successful.

There is a notable decline in levels of: *freedom of movement for men* (thin purple line) and *freedom of movement for women*¹⁸ (light blue line) indicators in 2008. Note


¹⁷ v2clrspct “Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?”

¹⁸ v2cldmovem “Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?”, v2cldmovew “Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?”

also the increase in the levels of the indicator for *freedom of academic and cultural expression*¹⁹(dark orange line), peaking during the 1999-2003 period.

Figure 16 includes nine other indicators. These have on average lower values to the overall index of civil liberties (thick red line) and can be regarded therefore as “least democratic” in terms of democratic qualities. *Access to justice for women* is represented by the thin brown line; *transparent laws* by the thin blue line; *property rights for men* by the thin green line; *social class inequality* by the thin black line; *overall access to justice* by the thin light orange line; a *rigorous and impartial public administration* by the thin dark pink line; *social group equality with respect to access to civil liberties* by the thin purple line; *freedom of religion* by the thin light pink line; and finally, *freedom from torture* by the thin light blue line.

Figure 16. Civil Liberties: “Least Democratic” indicators Georgia (1990-2012)



Another important change is in the values of the *freedom from torture*²⁰(light blue line), indicator during the 2003 to 2008 period. It is notable that many civil liberties indicators go up around the time of Rose revolution (2003 and 2004) while the only indicator to decline in 2008 is freedom from torture.

Judicial Independence and Autonomy on the Rise

Figure 17 presents the *judicial independence and autonomy* component. Most visible are the rapid rise in the values of the component after 1994 from a really low level,


¹⁹ v2clacfree “Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?”

²⁰ v2cltort “Is there freedom from torture?”

followed by a temporary and jagged decline during the 2003-2007 period. The independence and autonomy of the judicial sector then improves again with the new post-2008 regime but does not reach the top-level from 1998.

This indicator is one of the few that on average has been at a low level throughout the period. Even at its highest level in 1998 it reached only a modest “democraticness” at less than 0.5 on the standardized -2 to 2 range. This seems to be an area lagging behind many of the others in Georgia, and one that thus warrants further attention.

Figure 17. The Judiciary Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)




The measure of judicial independence is aggregated from seven indicators that are displayed separately in Figure 18. They include reforms that improve *judiciary's formal power* (thin pink line); the level of *arbitrary removals of judges* (thin orange line); the prevalence of explicit *government attacks on judiciary* (thin black line); degree of *judges accountability* (thin red line); *government compliance* with judicial rulings (thin dark blue line); the degree to which both judicial independence is respected by the government in cases that are *salient* (thin green lines); and lastly, the degree to which *judicial review* of new laws and regulations is practiced (thin light blue line). Higher values of these indicators indicate more judicial independence and autonomy and less government control of the judiciary.

The index of judicial independence and autonomy started at its lowest level in 1990 and picked up in 1995 after the new constitution was adopted. The country experts apparently find that a formal institution like the constitution can make a degree of difference and that is good news since constitutions and other formal institutions are relatively speaking easy to amend and revise. This constitution, among other things, put a system of checks and balances put in place. The biggest decline happens in 2004 immediately following the Rose revolution.

When the overall index for the judiciary is disaggregated, it is once again apparent that the aggregated index shrouds important and radically different developments in different areas.

Inspection of the disaggregated figure (Figure 18) reveals that the 1995 increase can be mainly explained by changes in the values of the *judicial review*²¹ (thin light-blue line) and *government compliance*²² (thin blue line) indicators. These indicators have increased in times of more governmental stability starting from 1995 with constitution and the legal system and practice coming into shape.

Figure 18. The Judiciary Dimension in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)



Interestingly, this upward trend is weakened by the decline in the values of the *government attacks on judiciary*²³ (thin black line) indicator that deteriorates all the

²¹ v2jureview "Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies...?"

²² v2juhccomp "How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?"

²³ v2jupoatck "How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?"

way to its lowest possible level between 2000 and 2006. It crumbled in particular in 1998 when president Shevardnadze sacked the entire corps of judges. This deterioration of the judicial independence and autonomy is further enforced as displayed by *purges of the judiciary* (thin orange line), particularly severe in the turbulent period of 2003 to 2006 when purges are especially severe and it is picked up by the indicator hitting rock-bottom.

The trend of these indicators is reverse to the indicator of *judges accountability*²⁴ (thin red line) and largely reflects the nature of the government attacks. Interestingly that the governmental attacks were highest before as well as after the Rose revolution, spanning the period between 2000 and 2006. Importantly, the *government attacks on judiciary* almost disappears after 2006, which the indicator's values picks up.

Finally, it is worth noting that the values of the *judicial reform* (thin pink line) values exhibit a high degree of variation across the 1997 to 2006 period, after adoption of the constitution of 1995 picking up the many efforts in Georgia from the government side to get a stronger hold on the judiciary. Here is an example of how large variation on an indicator can reflect multiple efforts at government control rather than merely shifting levels of "democraticness".

Deliberation


Figure 19 presents the aggregate *deliberation* component measure. A quite significant increase in the level of the deliberative dimension in Georgia is visible for especially the early 1989 to 1994 period, punctuated by a temporary slight decline from 2000 to 2003. Deliberation thus decreased according to the V-Dem index following the Shevardnadze's re-election to his second term and remained low till the year of the Rose revolution.

The (relatively modest) improvement in this aspect of democracy during the Rose revolution seems to follow intuition and tallies well with a general understanding of this period. A slight downward turn after such episodes is also natural when the pressures of revolutionary times with intense debates and protests decrease.

But the deliberative index is also composed of several indicators picking up varying aspects of a deliberative dimension to democracy that not always move in tandem. Once more we are reminded of the intricacy of measuring democracy and of the importance to have access to disaggregated indicators as well as the overall indices.

²⁴ v2jaccunt "When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct how often they are removed?"

Figure 19. Deliberation Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)



The measure of political deliberation (thick red line) is aggregated from five indicators displayed separately in Figure 20. In the graph, the coders' assessment to what extent political elites justify their positions in terms of the *common good* is displayed by the thin red line, the *range of political consultation* is presented by the thin blue line; the extent to which *political elites respect counterarguments* and whether they provide *reasoned justifications* are indicated by the thin black and the thin orange lines; while the level of elites' efforts at *society engagement* in public deliberations is portrayed by the purple line.

The disaggregated plot (Figure 20) reveals that, for example, the values of the *respect for counterarguments indicator* (thin green line) exhibit a consistent rise over time with a significant spike in "democraticness" in 2004. Meanwhile the *common good*²⁵ (thin red line) indicator exhibits a u-shaped pattern over time where the difficult period of 1993 to 2004 is reflected in a significantly lower value picking up the less value elites placed in this period on emphasizing the common good of all Georgians for important policy changes.


The *range of consultation*²⁶ (thin blue line) indicator exhibits an opposite and inverted u-shape with present levels of the range of consultations with a wider net of elites is at lower levels than ever since the 1994 reform period. While this could seem

²⁵ v2dlcommon "When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?"

²⁶ v2dlconslt "When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?"

contradictory to our common sense of deliberation being enhanced by more democratic periods, it is not difficult to explain.

Figure 20. Deliberation Dimension Disaggregated (1990-2012)




After the turbulent times and the 2008 elections leading to a dominant position for the current president and his party and affiliates, there is much less need for the ruling government to consult widely among elites. They have a strong mandate from the people and the seats in the legislature to pursue the policies they wish. Meanwhile, the politically weak and vulnerable governing coalitions in earlier periods needed to try and bring on board competing elites in order to stay in power and pursue their politics.

Importantly, many of the abrupt changes in the indicator values occur in 1993 and 2004. The polarized deliberation on the common good decreased since the reform of the major state institutions in 1994-1995 took place and intensified again after 2003 with the advent of various reforms agenda of the new leadership. This indicator went up concurrently with other indicators except for the range of consultations, which was constantly in decline since 2004 signifying the centralized manner of decisions made during the Saakashvili's presidency that interestingly came along with high level of respect for counterarguments.

Rising Political Equality?

Inspection of Figure 21 reveals the now familiar upward trend, whereby values of the dimension become larger over time with relatively sharp increase in 1993-1994. But it is also clear that the initial rise and the following developments are much less pronounced for the area of political equality than for most other areas of democracy in Georgia.


Figure 21. Equality Dimension in Georgia (1990-2012)



In the inspection of the disaggregated results based on the various indicators constituting this dimension, Figure 22 displays that the overall trend follows in particular the *social status and distribution of political power*²⁷ (thin yellow line) indicator that went up in 1994 and 2003. In overall these growth could be attributed some changes in access to political power that came with more stable political processes in mid-1990s and the reforms after 2003.

²⁷ v2pepwrse "is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?"

Figure 22. Equality Dimension in Georgia Disaggregated (1990-2012)



In addition, it is important to note the fluctuations in the values of the *gender and political power*²⁸ (thin green line) and *sexual orientation and political power*²⁹ (thin black line) indicators. Throughout the period the Georgian parliament had between 6 and 12 percent of women among its MPs and in various times women had different prominence being in elected and appointed positions, but with no clear trend for improving the situation. The many ups and downs are in part a result of the country experts for Georgia being relatively uncertain about the exact situation with regards to these indicators, which is in itself an interesting finding.

4. Conclusions & Reflections

The V-Dem index shows a gradual increase in democracy score over the post-soviet period and confirms often made observations of an improvement of democracy in the early 1990s, downturns of in 2003 and in 2007, and upturns after the Rose revolution in 2004 as well as after the latest parliamentary elections in 2012. Yet analysis of disaggregated index shows the variability and interrelations of different dimensions of democracy around these turning points in the post-soviet history of Georgia.

There are variations of dimensions in terms of their position regarding the aggregated score as well as in terms of degree of their variability. Electoral legitimacy

²⁸ v2pepwrgen "Is political power distributed according to gender?"

²⁹ v2pepwrt "To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?"

and judiciary, and in the early period electoral contestation, are below the average score while the rest were going along or above the average. Electoral legitimacy and electoral contestation scores show the biggest variations.

Almost all dimensions were changing the scores concurrently with few exceptions the most notable being judiciary in years immediately following the Rose revolution of 2003. There is also the reverse relation of *electoral legitimacy* with all other dimensions in early 90s. While in most of the instances changes in scores are concurrent there are some time lags. For example, the growth in media after 2008 was a forewarning for upward movement of other scores the following years, or media and civil society upturns in 1990-1994 preceded changes for other components in this period.

When looking at disaggregated scores within dimensions most notable findings present reverse relationships between some of the measures. An example of this is reverse trends in *deliberation* dimension between *common good* and all other measures till 2003, and then *the range of consultations* departs from the rest of measures. The same happens after 2003 with civil society *anti-systemic movement* that goes in opposite direction then the rest of measures in this dimension.

Besides viewing the composition of all dimensions that compose the V-Dem index, there is a possibility to look at what correlation between various scores across different dimensions. For example, one can look at co-variation of *legislative party cohesion* in party component and *common good* in deliberation component.

The scores in different components show that electoral process is one of the central aspects in determining the aggregate score and if to take the 2004 as a year of founding elections, then it would be interesting to look at one more electoral cycle after 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections to see what the Rose revolution, one of the key events in the post-soviet has brought for Georgia's democratization in a longer run.

References

- The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. Political Forum: 10 Questions on Georgia's Political Development. CIPDD, Tbilisi: 2007
- International Election Observation Mission. Parliamentary Elections, Georgia – 2 November 2003. OSCE/ODHIR, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, European Parliament.